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I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of the free market has been honored throughout the history
of the United States as advancing our economy by promoting competition.'
While the free market is an integral part of American culture, difficulty de-
velops when business practices overlap with public policy concerns. 2 Insur-
ance companies that provide hurricane coverage are in business to make a
* J.D. Candidate, May 2008, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Cen-
ter. Sara Graditor has a B.S. in Business Administration with a concentration in Marketing
from the University of Central Florida. She would like to thank her mother Linda and father
Warren as she is very grateful for their limitless support and unconditional love. She gives a
very special recognition to Senator Walter "Skip" Campbell for his help in developing issues
and contributing to the research for her article. The author wishes to express her great appre-
ciation for all the hard work of her colleagues at Nova Law Review and the faculty of the Law
Center, especially Professor Marilyn Blumberg Cane for her suggestions and guidance.
1. See Katherine Swartz, Justifying Government as the Backstop in Health Insurance
Markets, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHics 89 (2001).
2. See id.
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profit for themselves while the product they sell is protection for the insur-
eds' health and safety.3 Having a responsibility to look out for their insur-
eds' best interests, as well as their owners' financial well-being, creates a
conflict of interest.4 The issue that will be examined in this article is
whether, and to what extent, the federal or state government should become
involved in the hurricane insurance industry.
Part II discusses the current conditions of the insurance industry as a
whole and the consequences of the suffering hurricane insurance market.
Part III will explain the need for reinsurance and its effect on the insurance
industry. Part IV will analyze the effect the suffering insurance and reinsur-
ance industry has on residents of Florida. Part V will discuss how the state
government once became involved by enacting Florida's Valued Policy Law,
and why that law no longer provides the protection it once did. Part VI of
this article will explore how the state intends to provide a solution to the hur-
ricane insurance problem in Florida. Part VII will then discuss a proposal for
the Florida Legislature to take action and provide hurricane insurance to
Florida residents. Part VIII will conclude that state government involvement
is necessary to stabilize the hurricane insurance market and to protect its
citizens' health, safety, and welfare.
II. INSURANCE: THE BUSINESS THAT CANNOT AFFORD PROTECTION
A. The Industry
All Florida residents who have mortgages are required by law to obtain
homeowners insurance.' Homeowners insurance typically covers "every-
thing except flooding caused by rising water."6 An increasing number of
policies are excluding wind damage caused by hurricanes.7 Companies that
choose to stay in the hurricane insurance market in Florida must increase
rates to survive in the hurricane insurance industry. 8 Consumers cannot af-
3. See FLA. STAT. § 215.555 (2006).
4. See id.
5. Id.; Interview with Walter Campbell, Sen., Fla. S., in Fort Lauderdale, Fla. (July 5,
2006) (audio on file with Nova Law Review).
6. BRYAN NORCROSS, HURRICANE ALMANAC 2006: THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO STORMS
PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 195 (2006).
7. Id.
8. See KEvIN M. MCCARTY ET AL., FLA. S., TASK FORCE ON LONG-TERM SOLUTIONS FOR
FLORIDA'S HURRICANE INSURANCE MARKET 4 (2006), available at
http://www.fldfs.com/hurricaneinsurancetaskforce/TaskforceRS2/draftlts6.pdf [hereinafter
TASK FORCE 2006].
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ford to pay "'[t]hese skyrocketing insurance rates.' 9 Floridians are left with
two options: spend an enormous amount of money protecting their homes
from hurricanes, or not protect their homes from hurricanes at all.'0 Many
are not even afforded the luxury of having an option as insurers increasingly
refuse to write policies for homeowners who live in areas at greater risk. 1
Hurricane Andrew's economic impact in 1992 forced insurance compa-
nies to re-evaluate the hurricane insurance market in Florida. 2 Ranked as
one of the ten most expensive United States catastrophes, Hurricane Andrew
ranks number two causing property insurers to pay $21.6 billion in property
coverage to this date.13 Residents of Florida sought "property and casualty
insurers to fund the long process of rebuilding."' 4 As a result of Hurricane
Andrew, "ten of the state's insurers" went bankrupt.' 5 Prior to Hurricane
Andrew, insurers capitalized on the construction boom in South Florida by
insuring homes at rates that were "inadequate to cover potential hurricane
losses."' 16 "It is a gross understatement to say that the potential destruction
resulting from a hurricane of Andrew's magnitude was largely unanticipated
both by the citizens of South Florida and their state and local governmental
officials."' 7
9. Beatrice E. Garcia, Keys Residents Storming Mad Over Insurance Rate Hikes: Keys
Residents and Business Owners Voice Worries About Huge Insurance Rate Increases, Fearing
Monroe County's Economy Will Be Hurt, KNIGHT RIDDER TRIB. Bus. NEWS, June 27, 2006, at
1 [hereinafter Garcia, Keys Residents Storming].
10. See TASK FORCE 2006, supra note 8, at 14.
11. Jonathan Brennan Butler, Insurers Under Fire: Assessing the Constitutionality of
Florida's Residential Property Insurance Moratorium After Hurricane Andrew, 22 FLA. ST.
U.L. REv. 731, 733-34 (1995). Florida's extremely high reading on the "hurricane property
risk scale" varies between 300 and 600. Fritz Yohn, Insurers Can Tame Hurricane Expo-
sures, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, June 12, 2006, at 12. This scale is based on two factors including
the "likelihood of a hurricane striking most any area within the state" and the magnitude of
property located in "counties having the highest hurricane likelihood." Id. Therefore, Florida
"[h]omeowners are being denied insurance or face crippling premiums." Janice Smith, Letter
to the Editor, FPL Only Part of Hurricane Issues, SUN-SENTINEL, June 14, 2006, at 20A.
12. See Butler, supra note 11, at 732-34. "Andrew was a wake-up call and learning
experience for the Florida market in 1992." See also TASK FORCE 2006, supra note 8, at 14.
13. TASK FORCE 2006, supra note 8, at 13. Hurricane Katrina is the most costly catastro-
phe to date incurring over $38 billion in insured losses. Id.
14. Butler, supra note 11, at 732.
15. Id. at 733.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 732.
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The 2004 and 2005 hurricane seasons further reinforced the desire for
insurance companies to abandon the hurricane insurance market in Florida. 8
The 2004 season experienced four hurricanes "together creat[ing] 1.66 mil-
lion claims resulting in $20.9 billion dollars of insured losses in the Florida
market."' 9 The 2005 season resulted in another four hurricanes causing in-
surance companies a great delay in "recovering, recapitalizing, and rebuild-
ing" from the previous year. 20 The mentality shifted from preparing for the
return of another devastating Category Five hurricane, like Andrew, to pre-
paring for multiple storms of less magnitude, but of equal, if not greater,
economic impact.
2
'
Insurance companies used Andrew as a model in determining which in-
surance policies to renew or whether to renew them at all.22 In response,
insurers concluded that policies must be withdrawn in the coastal regions of
Florida.23 This conclusion remains as insurance companies increasingly re-
duce their risk of catastrophic loss by cutting back their level of exposure.24
Decisions by insurance companies to cancel policies after being with an in-
sured for "'years and years without filing a claim' are the insurers' reaction
to "not making money in the Florida homeowners' insurance market.
2 5
B. Florida's Response
The state has used its police powers to provide disaster relief by "taking
responsibility for the worst or highest risks" in the hurricane insurance mar-
ket. 6 After Hurricane Andrew, the Florida Residential Property Casualty
Joint Underwriting Association was established.27 This association was to
"provide a public/private response to the deterioration of insurance availabil-
18. See TASK FORCE 2006, supra note 8, at 14. "[T]he hurricanes of 2004 and 2005 of-
fered important lessons and insights to its citizens, legislators, insurers, reinsurers, and insur-
ance regulators." Id.
19. Id. at 11 (referring to Hurricanes Charley, Ivan, Frances, and Jeanne).
20. Id. at 12 (referring to Hurricanes Dennis, Katrina, Rita, and Wilma). As of March 6,
2006, "these four storms are estimated to have generated a combined 1.17 million claims and
at least a combined $9.3 billion in insured losses in Florida." Id.
21. See TASK FORCE 2006, supra note 8, at 14.
22. Butler, supra note 11, at 733.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Wayne T. Price, Brevard Faces Grim Reality of Insurance, FLA. TODAY, Apr. 5,
2006, at Al (quoting Sam Miller, the Executive Vice President of the Florida Insurance Coun-
cil).
26. Swartz, supra note 1, at 90; see FLA. STAT. § 215.555(1)(a)-(b) (2006).
27. TASK FORCE 2006, supra note 8, at 40.
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ity in the private market., 28 In addition, the Florida Windstorm Underwrit-
ing Association was created by law to make secure windstorm coverage for
residential policyholders unable to obtain it in the voluntary market. 29 To-
gether, the associations covered approximately 1.35 million policies with an
"exposure of almost $86.5 billion."30
Citizens Property Insurance Corporation (Citizens) was created in 2002
to encompass both entities.3 Citizens' rates are required by law to be higher
than the rates of private insurers. 32 As a result, Citizens has a rate structure
that is not meant to compete with the private market. In fact, it is
"[d]esigned to offer insurance only where the private market will not provide
coverage" making it the "provider of last resort.,
34
The 2006 hurricane season presented some obstacles for Citizens.35 Poe
Financial Group (Poe), one of South Florida's largest property insurers, liq-
uidated its Florida property insurance business.36 Citizens, being the state's
insurer of last resort, then took over all of Poe's property and casualty poli-
cies. 37 Not only did Citizens take over more than 300,000 policies from Poe,
Citizens must also accommodate 50,000 new property and casualty applica-
tions it receives per month.38 The "explosive" growth of Citizens has forced
it to increase rates and decrease coverage. 39 Insurers insist that "[a] determi-
nation will have to be made on whether there is a public policy obligation to
insure all structures in the state. 4°
In addition to "insuring too many high-risk properties," Citizens never
fully recovered from the 2004 and 2005 hurricane seasons.4 ' During those
seasons, "Citizens collected $1.2 billion in premiums, but paid out more than
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See FLA. STAT. § 627.351(6)(a)(2), (u)(2); Christopher Oster, Carrick Mollenkamp, &
Chad Terhune, Hurricane Damage: After Storms, Florida Wakes Up to a New Insurance
Reality, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 2004, at Al.
32. FLA. STAT. § 627.351(6)(m)(10).
33. Id. § 627.351(6)(m)(1)(a).
34. TASK FORCE 2006, supra note 8, at 40.
35. See Harriet Johnson Brackley, Judge Orders Troubled Insurer to Liquidate: Citizens
Ready to Take over Poe Policies, SuN-SENTINEL, June 1, 2006, at ID.
36. Id.
37. Randy Diamond, Citizens Not Happy to Be No. 1, TAMPA TRIB., June 29, 2006, at 1.
38. Id.
39. See Interview with Walter Campbell, supra note 5.
40. TASK FORCE 2006, supra note 8, at 40-41.
41. See Diamond, supra note 37.
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$3.9 billion in claims" incurring a loss of approximately $2 billion.12 Florida
decreased the loss to Citizens by paying a portion of the deficit with sales tax
revenues. 43 In exchange, the Florida State Legislature required Citizens to
collect enough money from customers to provide for future damage. 44 This
leaves Citizens without any other option but to increase rates. 5 The question
is how much? "Insurance analysts say one of the determining factors as to if
and how much premiums may rise depends on the hit reinsurers take., 46
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF REINSURANCE
A. Reinsurance
Basically, reinsurance is insurance for insurance companies.4 7 Insur-
ance companies purchase insurance from reinsurance companies "to aid in
covering larger-than-expected losses. 48  As in any other business, a rate
increase in the reinsurance industry results in a rate increase in the insurance
industry. 49  Consumers cannot escape "trickle-down economics"50 as the
"investment outlook for the reinsurance industry is negative."'"
The reinsurance industry continues to undergo legal problems in regards
to "bid rigging and improper reinsurance contracts. '52 "[S]everal state attor-
neys general .... the SEC, and the Department of Justice" continue to con-
duct investigations on reports published in February 2006, indicating several
"former executives at General Re Corp., a leading U.S. reinsurer," commit-
ted fraud from a reinsurance deal in 2000."3 Stemming from those fraud
42. CATHERINE A. SEIFERT & JOE NIEDZIELSKI, STANDARD & POOR'S, INDUSTRY SURVEYS:
INSURANCE: PROPERTY-CASUALTY 7 (July 13, 2006).
43. See TASK FORCE 2006, supra note 8, at 48; see Diamond, supra note 37.
44. Kathy Bushouse, Florida Legislature Leaves Much Unresolved on Insurance Issue,
KNIGHT RIDDER TRIB. Bus. NEWS, May 9, 2006, at 1 [hereinafter Bushouse, Florida Legisla-
ture].
45. See id.
46. Darren Currin, Commentary: Insurance Fears in Hurricanes' Wake, ST. LOUIS
DAILY RECORD, Sept. 30, 2005, at 1.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. CATHERINE SEIFERT, STANDARD & POOR'S, SuB-INDuSTRY REVIEW: REINSURANCE
(2006) [hereinafter SEIFERT 2006]. The most recent outlook for the reinsurance industry sug-
gests it is neutral, but this is mostly due to the fact that many reinsurers were able to profit
from the "mild hurricane season in 2006." See CATHERINE SEIFERT, STANDARD & POOR'S,
SUB-INDUSTRY REVIEW: REINSURANCE (2007).
52. SEIFERT & NIEDZIELSKI, supra note 42, at 6.
53. SEIFERT 2006, supra note 51.
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charges, an ongoing investigation of many other reinsurers is taking place. 4
"Some insurers now advocate for a federal regulator that would allow them
to bypass the current system that regulates insurance on a state-by-state ba-
sis." 5 This seems unlikely to happen as "the National Association of Insur-
ance Commissioners (NAIC), the organization of state insurance commis-
sioners, [argue] that industry standards across state lines can be developed
under the current system."56 The consequences of these ongoing investiga-
tions create barriers to an already unattractive market, "dampen[ing] investor
enthusiasm for many reinsurance stocks."5 "
Further, the insolvency of smaller reinsurers aid in further consolidation
of the reinsurance market. 18 As "larger, financially stronger" reinsurers take
over the industry, there is a concern that competitive pricing will soon disap-
pear."9 There is a strong indication that "reinsurers are reconsidering the
risk/return relationships available when compared with other investment
opportunities."60 The January 2006 market closed transactions at a slower
rate than in the past, including 2005.61 "[W]hile overall rates appear not to
have increased dramatically, wind reinsurance along the Gulf States is re-
ported to have risen substantially. 62
Legislators increasingly "face heightened public pressure" to provide
solutions to the declining reinsurance market before it exacerbates any fur-
ther.63 In response to the public, former Florida Governor Jeb Bush signed
legislation in May 2006 offering loans to insurers, encouraging them to write
policies in Florida. 64 In addition, Citizens is required by law to "make its
best efforts to procure catastrophe reinsurance at reasonable rates. 65 How-
ever, "reasonable rates" are expected "to cover [a] projected 100-year prob-
able maximum lOSS. '' 66 The bottom line is "[i]nsurers are ... buying more
reinsurance protection and paying more for that coverage. 6 7
54. See id.
55. SEIFERT & NIEDZIELSKI, supra note 42, at 5.
56. Id. at 5-6.
57. SEIFERT 2006, supra note 51.
58. SEIFERT & NIEDZIELSKI, supra note 42, at 1.
59. See id.
60. TASK FORCE 2006, supra note 8, at 13.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. SEIFERT & NIEDZIELSKI, supra note 42, at 2.
64. Id.
65. FLA. STAT. § 627.351(6)(c)(10) (2006).
66. TASK FORCE 2006, supra note 8, at 52 (quoting Fla. Stat. § 627.351(6)(c)(9)).
67. SEIFERT & NIEDZIELSKI, supra note 42, at 7.
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B. The Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund
The problems with the residential property insurance market, caused by
Hurricane Andrew, in effect created problems with the reinsurance market.68
As reinsurers became more and more hesitant to provide coverage for insur-
ers in Florida, state action was deemed necessary to stabilize the market.69
Section 215.555 of the Florida Statutes created the Florida Hurricane Catas-
trophe Fund (FHCF) in an effort to protect the residents of Florida from an-
other catastrophic hurricane loss.70 Acting as a state administered reinsur-
ance program, the FHCF will partially reimburse those insurers who experi-
ence such a loss.7 Every property insurer who writes covered policies in
Florida is required to purchase reinsurance from the FHCF.12 This provides
insurance companies with security and encourages them to conduct business
in Florida."3
However, the overpowering combination of the 2004 and 2005 hurri-
cane seasons caused the cash resources of the FHCF to become strained.7 4
The four hurricanes in 2004 incurred insured losses of approximately $21
billion from 1.67 million claims.75 The FHCF valued their losses at $3.85
billion of that total amount.76 In 2005, Hurricane Wilma alone caused about
$7.9 billion in insured losses from residential property.77 The FHCF expects
to lose at least $2.6 billion of that total amount. 8
Further, computer models used to predict future economic impact of
hurricanes proved to be grossly inaccurate.79 Consumer demand surged as
an inevitable consequence of the previous hurricane seasons.80 As a result,
the FHCF incurred a loss for which it did not prepare.8 1 "With 10% adverse
loss development," FHCF must reserve $3.1 billion, the total amount of cash
available, to be used for claims made from the 2005 losses.8 2 Since the
68. FLA. STAT. § 215.555(1)(b).
69. Id. § 215.555(1)(a).
70. See id. § 215.555.
71. Id. § 215.555(4)(a).
72. Id.
73. See generally FLA. STAT. § 215.555.
74. TASK FORCE 2006, supra note 8, at 47.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. TASK FORCE 2006, supra note 8, at 47.
80. Id.
81. See id.
82. Id.
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FHCF's cash resources will be exhausted due to the 2005 claims, "there will
not be any cash available to be carried forward for 2006 claims payments
when the 2006 hurricane season begins. 83 Without the FHCF able to pro-
vide reimbursement, insurers will need to be issued revenue bonds to recu-
perate.84 Legislators issued $1.5 billion in bonds to help the FHCF recover
from a $1.41 billion deficit resulting from the 2005 hurricane season.85 The
FHCF borrowed an additional $2.8 billion in preparation for the 2006 hurri-
cane season.8 6 Few future preventative measures exist for the FHCF. 87 Ex-
pansion of the monetary fund for the FHCF is not an option because Florida
policyholders, including "all property and casualty policyholders excluding
workers compensation and medical malpractice," would be placed in the
position of funding the added coverage. 8  Reduction of the fund would
worsen the problem as cash reserves would diminish at a faster rate, increas-
ing the need to issue bonds.89
The Florida Administrative Code allows insurance companies in Florida
to raise rates as long as they are approved by state regulators.9" Among the
few expense factors taken into consideration in each homeowner's rate filing
is the cost of reinsurance.9 In fact, reinsurance is broken down into specific
expense factors which are taken into account when determining the cost of
reinsurance in relation to the price of rates.92
State Farm Florida Insurance Co. (State Farm) "insures more than one
million policyholders statewide."93 The company submitted its rates early to
state regulators in hope to secure and collect higher premiums.' As Flor-
ida's number two home insurer, a request was made "for the company's larg-
est-ever rate increase in the state." 95 However, this request was made prior
to learning of the significant increase in cost for reinsurance. 96 State Farm
withdrew its initial request to reevaluate how high rates must be to make a
83. Id.
84. TASK FORCE 2006, supra note 8, at 47.
85. Stephanie Horvath & Dara Kam, State's Disaster Fund Boosted, PALM BEACH POST,
June 16, 2006, at ID.
86. Id.
87. See TASK FORCE 2006, supra note 8, at 47.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE r. 690-170.013 (2006).
91. Id. r. 690-170.014(10)(f).
92. Id. r. 690-170.014(11).
93. Kathy Bushouse, State Farm Aims Higher: Reinsurance Tab to Force Second Re-
quest for Even Steeper Rate Increases, SUN-SENTINEL, July 7, 2006, at ID.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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profit. 97 This presents the question as to whether the FHCF, by providing
additional insurance capacity, continues to serve its purpose to improve the
state's economy and protect its citizens' health, safety, and welfare.9"
IV. THE HARD TRUTH
Generally, the purpose for insurance is to provide security for its con-
sumers.99 Insurance companies guarantee their ability to provide money to
their policyholders in situations where the policyholder might undergo an
unaffordable, unforeseeable loss."°° Thus, the reason why consumers pur-
chase hurricane insurance is to gain some sense of assurance that they will be
able to rebuild or reconstruct their home in the event of a catastrophic loss. 01
Without this guarantee, there would be no need for insurance companies.'02
Fear sets in when consumers are unable to afford to protect themselves with
hurricane insurance.103 The situation becomes worse when the consumer is
no longer in control and is refused coverage entirely. "
As "no place in Florida is immune from hurricane risk," the need to pro-
tect one's home applies to every resident of Florida." 5 People who live
along the coast cannot find hurricane insurance because private insurance
companies refuse to write them policies. 106 This is because "practically all
private insurers consider the [coast] too risky."10 7 As a result, Citizens must
provide them with the necessary insurance to protect them from potential
hurricane damage.'08 However, as noted above, Citizens' rates must be sig-
nificantly higher than those offered by private insurers. '09 Many cannot "af-
ford to live on either coast or nearby."" 0  The attitude of some is: "If you
cannot afford the cost or it is not available in your area, you should move.""'l
97. Id.
98. See TASK FORCE 2006, supra note 8, at 46.
99. See generally FLA. STAT. § 627.351 (2006).
100. Id.
101. Id
102. Id.
103. Garcia, Keys Residents Storming, supra note 9.
104. Id.
105. TASK FORCE 2006, supra note 8, at 15.
106. Interview with Walter Campbell, supra note 5.
107. Garcia, Keys Residents Storming, supra note 9.
108. See FLA. STAT. § 627.351 (2006).
109. Id.
110. Marvin Meyerhoffer, State Should Take a Role in Bolstering Citizens Insurance, THE
LEDGER (Lakeland, Fla.), Dec. 29, 2005, at A10.
111. Id.
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However, the hard truth is that "millions of coastal homeowners remain in-
adequately insured and unprepared for the [next hurricane] season."" 2
Even when Floridians are able to find residential hurricane insurance, it
costs an enormous amount."' Some believe Floridians need to gain an un-
derstanding that insurance companies are businesses that need to make a
profit to survive.'14 Since insurers are "working furiously" to secure a future
profit, it is easy for them to forget the very purpose insurance companies
were meant to serve. 15 Thus, homeowners are unable to secure insurance
rates at reasonable amounts." 6 Moreover, Citizens simply cannot afford to
cover every homeowner in Florida.' "[T]he bottom line on homeowners
insurance is harsh: Costs more. Covers less."'" 8
Further, those who spend the money to be insured have significant diffi-
culty collecting on their policy when a catastrophe actually does occur." 9 A
hurricane's impact on a community leads policyholders to make claims."12
This causes insurance companies to incur a huge loss upon payment of every
policy."'2 Therefore, insurance claims and disputes over coverage are inevi-
table. 2  Since many insurers "are not going to pay up," multiple lawsuits are
filed against insurance companies. 23 In fact, lawsuits are still taking place
from hurricanes that occurred in Florida about ten years ago. 2 4
The on-going need for a solution progresses as fewer options exist
every day. 25 Florida State Senator Walter "Skip" Campbell explains:
We are going to have a major crisis statewide with people that
can[not] afford property insurance rates and that [is] going to cre-
ate a crisis in multiple sectors of our economy. [P]eople will not
be able to sell their houses because there won't be buyers because
112. Survey Shows Residents in Hurricane- Vulnerable States Under Insured, NEW
ORLEANS CITY Bus., May 16, 2006, at 1.
113. Smith, supra note 11.
114. Robert Sims, Editorial, Insurance Industry Needs Regulating, SUN-SENTINEL, June
14, 2006, at 20A.
115. Beatrice E. Garcia, Check Your Coverage Carefully, MIAMI HERALD, May 24, 2006,
at 13 [hereinafter Garcia, Check Your Coverage].
116. Id.
117. See TASK FORCE 2006, supra note 8, at 40-41.
118. Garcia, Check Your Coverage, supra note 115.
119. Daniel Ostrovsky, Following Hurricanes, Litigation Against Insurance Companies
Increases, THE DAILY RECORD (Baltimore), Aug. 31, 2005, at 1.
120. See SEIFERT & NIEDZIELSKI, supra note 42, at 1-2.
121. Id.
122. See Ostrovsky, supra note 119.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Interview with Walter Campbell, supra note 5.
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buyers can[not] afford to pay the taxes and insurance. So, the
banks are going to hurt, the mortgage companies are going to hurt,
[the] real estate agents are going to hurt, and [the] general econ-
omy is going to start hurting because we will not have people who
can, in fact, live in our communities to perform the jobs that we
need; such as teaching, such as police officers ... this is going to
go one level even further down because we are seeing some of the
commercial property owners . . . having the same problems as the
residential community, which is they're getting hit with increased
property taxes and almost astronomical property insurance rates.
So, what do they do? [They increase rent.] This is the beginning
of the problem and it's more far-reaching than anybody can ever
think about. 1
26
Awareness of the increasing insurance problems in Florida has caused
many residents to voice their opinions as to what actions the state should take
in response to this predicament. 127 As "the continued availability of property
insurance . . . is critical to the state's economic survival," the controversial
topic of whether state action is necessary in response to hurricane insurance
problems, once again, presents itself to the Florida Legislature. 1
28
V. THE PREEMPTION OF A VERY OLD STATUTE
A. Florida's Valued Policy Law
Problems with the insurance industry prompted the Florida Legislature
to act as long ago as 1899 when its first valued policy law was put into ac-
tion. 129 "A valued policy is 'one in which the value of the thing insured, and
also the amount to be paid thereon in the event of loss, is settled by agree-
ment between the parties and inserted in the policy."" 3 The "principal ob-
ject and purpose" of Florida's valued policy law is to determine the amount
of money the insurer must pay the insured in the event of a total loss, prior to
the occurrence of such an event.' 3 ' Moreover, it "requires the insurer to as-
certain the insurable value at the time of writing the policy," and to write it
126. Id.
127. See, e.g., Sims, supra note 114; Smith, supra note 11.
128. TASKFORCE2006,supra note 8, at 10.
129. See John V. Garaffa, Florida's " Valued Policy'" Law-The Eye of the Storm, 79 FLA.
B.J. 8 (Apr. 2005).
130. R. Jason Richards, Florida's "Valued Policy Law": Clarifying Some Recent Miscon-
ceptions, 79 FLA. B.J. 18, 19 (Dec. 2005) (quoting Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Curl, 721 So. 2d 431,
433 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998)).
131. See Garaffa, supra note 129, at 8; see also FLA. STAT. § 627.702 (2006).
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therein. 3 2 The statute plays a major role in insurance law as it "is part of
every real property casualty insurance policy written on property in Flor-
ida." 133
The statute serves to prevent future problems between insurers and poli-
cyholders by resolving the issue of how much the insurer must pay without
the trouble of negotiation or litigation. 134 It "operates like a liquidated dam-
ages clause rather than as an indemnity contract."' 3 5 The statute states:
In the event of the total loss of any building, structure, mobile
home... or manufactured building... located in this state and in-
sured by any insurer as to a covered peril... the insurer's liability
under the policy for such total loss, if caused by a covered peril,
shall be in the amount of money for which such property was so
insured as specified in the policy and for which a premium has
been charged and paid. 136
The statute emphasizes that two requirements must be met to qualify
under the valued policy law. 137 First, an insurer must insure the property as a
covered peril. 138 Second, the damage incurred must amount to a total loss. 139
However, "the statute does not define the term 'total loss."" 14 ° For over a
century, it has been left to the courts to determine and define what constitutes
a total loss."'4 Two tests evolved by case law including the identity test and
the restoration test. 142
First, the identity test will apply if the damage caused to the home "is so
severe that it has lost its identity and character." '1 3 This test is satisfied even
if the home is capable of being used for an alternative useful purpose.'" The
identity test is also met in the event of a constructive total loss. 14 A con-
structive total loss occurs when "an ordinance or regulation prevents repair"
132. Garaffa, supra note 129, at 8.
133. Mierzwa v. Fla. Windstorm Underwriting Ass'n, 877 So. 2d 774, 775 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 2004).
134. See FLA. STAT. § 627.702.
135. Richards, supra note 130, at 19.
136. FLA. STAT. § 627.702(l)(a).
137. See id. § 627.702(1)(b); Mierzwa, 877 So. 2d at 775.
138. § 627.702(1)(b); Mierzwa, 877 So. 2d at 775.
139. § 627.702(l)(b); Mierzwa, 877 So. 2d at 775.
140. See FLA. STAT. § 627.702; Garaffa, supra note 129, at 10.
141. Garaffa, supra note 129, at 10.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 10-11.
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of the damage caused by the hurricane. '46 As a result, the identity is essen-
tially lost. 147 Second, the restoration test applies in situations where "a rea-
sonably prudent owner" would not rebuild property to its pre-loss condition
with the remains of the structure. 1
48
B. The State Controversy
The interpretation of the valued policy law in Florida has set forth con-
troversy between insurers and policyholders since its inception.' 49  In
Mierzwa v. Florida Windstorm Underwriting Ass 'ni5° in June 2004, the val-
ued policy law was found to apply to different covered perils insured by mul-
tiple insurers.' A homeowner's wind insurance was provided by one car-
rier, while the flood insurance was provided by another carrier.' The wind
insurer's "policy expressly excluded flood damage."' 53 A local ordinance
was applied by the court to determine whether the home was a total loss. '
54
It provided that damage caused to a structure requiring repairs amounting to
more than fifty percent of its existing value must conform to the building
code."' A determination was made "that the total cost of repairs to the in-
sured building would exceed half of its value."' 56 Following this determina-
tion, the building had to be torn down and the site elevated. '17 Thus, the
court held that despite the separate policies covering separate perils, the
combination of the damage caused by wind in addition to the damage caused
by flood amounted to a total loss and resulted in the application of the valued
policy law.'58
The court of appeals found no causation requirement in establishing a
total loss because the valued policy law was "simple and straightforward."' 59
According to the court, the valued policy law only requires the covered peril
146. Garaffa, supra note 129, at 11.
147. See id.
148. Id.
149. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Redding, 37 So. 62, 65 (Fla. 1904) (holding the valued pol-
icy law is constitutional).
150. 877 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
151. Id. at776.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Mierzwa, 877 So. 2d at 776.
156. Id.
157. See id. at 776 n.3.
158. Id. at 775.
159. Id.; Garaffa, supra note 129, at 13.
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"be a covered peril" and not "the covered peril causing the entire loss."'
160
Moreover, Mierzwa established that courts may find a total loss by combin-
ing policies and applying the valued policy law even in situations where an
insurer expressly excludes certain types of coverage. 161 "Florida courts have
for years upheld an insurer's right to recover under two separate policies in
the event of a total loss under the valued policy law."162 However, legisla-
tive intent continues to be questioned as to whether the valued policy law is
meant to apply in these specific situations where perils are expressly ex-
cluded from coverage.163 The controversy exists precisely because the insur-
ance carrier is liable for the face amount of the policy only when a total loss
is established. 1
C. Federal Preemption
In a recent decision, the United States District Court of the Northern
District of Florida held that Florida's Valued Policy Law was preempted by
federal law. 165 In Greer v. Owners Insurance Co., 166 two separate insurance
policies provided separate types of coverage for one home. 167 One insurance
company only provided wind and fire insurance, expressly excluding flood
insurance from the policy.'68 The other insurance policy only covered dam-
age caused by floods. 169 The flood insurance policy was provided by the
National Flood Insurance Program "established by Congress, through the
National Flood Insurance Act."' 17 The court placed emphasis solely on the
fact that the director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) controls "the payment or disallowance of all flood insurance
claims."'' Those "[c]laims are paid out of a National Flood Insurance Fund
in the United States Treasury."' 72 Therefore, all the terms and conditions of
160. Mierzwa, 877 So. 2d at 776 (The court places strong emphasis on the distinction
between "the" covered peril and "a" covered peril by using italics in the opinion).
161. See id. at 779.
162. Richards, supra note 130, at 18.
163. Garaffa, supra note 129, at 5.
164. See Mierzwa, 877 So. 2d at 775.
165. Greer v. Owners Ins. Co., 434 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1275 (N.D. Fla. 2006).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1269-70.
168. Id. at 1270.
169. Id.
170. Greer, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 1274; see 42 U.S.C. § 4001 (2000).
171. Greer, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 1274.
172. Id.
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flood insurance policies are mandated and controlled by federal, not state,
regulations. '
It usually takes the combination of wind and flood damage for a build-
ing to lose its identity or appearance, thus making it a total loss for which the
valued policy law would apply. '74 Since the state cannot regulate the amount
of compensation one might receive after incurring flood damage, the valued
policy law will no longer apply in many situations.' The state's solution to
help its residents receive reimbursement towards protecting and securing
one's home is now outdated and essentially useless. 76
The state has taken few steps toward providing a solution to Florida's
insurance problem since the first valued policy law was enacted in 1899.177
Florida's legislature has placed little responsibility on property and casualty
insurance companies to charge affordable rates.77 This includes whether
hurricane insurance must be provided by insurers in addition to the more
profitable lines already offered, or if an insurer is required to provide hurri-
cane insurance at all. 179 "Many people have a philosophical problem with
the government[] being [involved] in the insurance business."' 80 "There is
now a widespread belief among economists, policy analysts, and policy-
makers that government should intervene in a market only when conditions
for competition are not in place, and the market fails to be efficient."
'181
There is no question that the hurricane insurance industry in Florida has lost
its appeal to private insurers and the market continues to decline.8 2 "[T]he
Florida legislature [must] get tough with the insurance industry," the only
question is how. 
83
173. Id.
174. See generally Mierzwa v. Fla. Windstorm Underwriting Ass'n, 877 So. 2d 774 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
175. See Greer, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 1275.
176. See generally id.
177. See generally Garaffa, supra note 129, at 8.
178. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. § 690-170.013 (2004). A negative inference can be
drawn from the administrative code. Id. It provides certain procedural steps an insurer must
take prior to changing rates, but does not provide a cap for which rates may not exceed. Id.
179. Id.
180. NoRcRoss, supra note 6, at 238 (emphasis added).
181. Swartz, supra note 1, at 90.
182. See Mark Hollis, Insurance Policy: Four Varied Views, SUN-SENTINEL, July 26,
2006, at 10B.
183. Smith, supra note 11.
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VI. INTENTIONS, PLANS, PROPOSALS, & PROBLEMS
One option for the federal government is to shift the risk of very high
cost coastal properties away from carriers by "tak[ing] on the role of rein-
surer." 14 A memorial written by the Florida Legislature was presented to
the United States Congress urging their support in establishing a National
Catastrophe Insurance Program (Program).'8 5 Included in the proposal, the
Florida Legislature urged the United States Congress to:
1. Provid[e] consumers with a private market residential insurance
program that provides all-perils protection.
2. Promot[e] personal responsibility through mitigation; promot[e]
the retrofitting of existing housing stock; and provid[e] individuals
with the ability to manage their own disaster savings accounts that,
similar to health savings accounts, accumulate on a tax-advantaged
basis for the purpose of paying for mitigation enhancements and
catastrophic losses.
3. Creat[e] tax-deferred insurance company catastrophe reserves to
benefit policyholders. These tax-deferred reserves would build up
over time and [would] only be eligible to be used to pay for future
catastrophic losses.
4. Enhanc[e] local and state government's role in establishing and
maintaining effective building codes, mitigation education, and
land use management; promot[e] state emergency management,
preparedness, and response; and creat[e] state or multistate re-
gional catastrophic risk financing mechanisms such as the Florida
Hurricane Catastrophe Fund.
5. Creat[e] a national catastrophe financing mechanism that would
provide a quantifiable level of risk management and financing for
mega-catastrophes; maximiz[e] the risk-bearing capacity of the
private markets; and allow[] for aggregate risk pooling of natural
disasters funded through sound risk-based premiums paid in cor-
rect proportion by all policyholders in the United States. 1
86
184. Swartz, supra note 1, at 99. The government can shift high cost risk from carriers by
either "provid[ing] financial coverage outright" or by providing reinsurance. Id.
185. Fla. HM 541 (2006). A memorial is "[a] written statement of facts presented to a
legislature... as a petition." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 445 (2d ed. 2001).
186. Fla. HM 541 (2006).
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In sum, the Program would provide a uniform approach in responding
to catastrophes.' 87 A catastrophe is defined by the Insurance Services Office
as "an event that causes $25 million or more in insured property losses and
affects a significant number of property/casualty policyholders and insur-
ers.""'88 Therefore, natural disasters are not the only types of catastrophes.' 9
In response to the memorial, three bills were introduced to the United
States Congress.'9" All three address at least one element of the national
catastrophe fund proposal.' 9' One bill proposes to create a "Consumer Hur-
ricane and Earthquake Protection Fund."'192 This bill applies to all natural
catastrophes, such as tornadoes, volcanic eruptions, and hurricanes.' 93 If
enacted, it would provide reinsurance to insurance companies at lower rates
than they can obtain on the private market. 94 Similar to Florida's Hurricane
Catastrophe Fund, the Consumer Hurricane and Earthquake Protection Fund
"would be responsible for losses up to amounts determined on a state-to-state
or regional basis."' 95  States that already have catastrophe funds, such as
Florida, would pay losses up to their limits prior to receiving income from
the national fund. '96 In effect, "[t]he national fund would sell reinsurance to
the state funds."' 97 As the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund struggles to
recapitalize, this proposed bill does not set forth future safeguards against an
unexpected depletion of funds. 98
Another bill proposes to create the "Catastrophe Savings Account Act
of 2006."'99 Adding a chapter to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, this
Act would allow consumers "to manage a personal, tax-exempt Catastrophe
Savings Account. ' '200 The account, acting as a trust fund, would secure
money to be set aside for the exclusive use of designated beneficiaries in
187. See id.
188. Fla. H.R. Comm. on NCIP, HM 541 (2006) Staff Analysis 3 (rev. Apr. 12, 2006)
[hereinafter HM 541 Staff Analysis].
189. Id.
190. Id. at 3-4.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 3.
193. HM 541 Staff Analysis, supra note 188, at 3-4.
194. Id. at 3.
195. Id. at 4.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. See HM 541 Staff Analysis, supra note 188, at 3-4.
199. Id. at 4.
200. Id.
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their time of need.21 The bill would establish certain requirements to be met
delineating which money would qualify under the Act. 212
The third bill presented to Congress proposes to create the "Policy-
holder Disaster Protection Act of 2005."'203 This bill suggests that Congress
provide incentives to insurance companies to provide natural disaster insur-
ance by revising the current tax laws.20 4 It recommends that insurance com-
panies have the ability to defer their taxes on claims arising from natural
disasters.205 The event must be a windstorm, earthquake, fire, flood, volcanic
eruption, tsunami, winter catastrophe, or hail.20 6 Further, it must be desig-
nated a catastrophe by either the President of the United States, the Property
Claim Services, "or by the chief executive official of a [s]tate or territory of
the United States, or the District of Columbia."2 7
While all three bills purport to move toward the goal of providing sta-
bility in the hurricane insurance industry, "[t]hey don't deal with reality or
solve problems, they just move money around., 28 Since damage caused by
hurricanes is unpredictable, it is difficult for insurance companies to calcu-
late future projections. 29 A national catastrophe fund, applying to all natural
catastrophes, is said to help make future projections more predictable.210 In
effect, this would allow insurance companies to "make a reasonable estimate
of what their losses will be and what they have to charge., 211 A national
catastrophe fund conceptually would provide a solution for stabilizing the
hurricane insurance market, while allowing consumers to have access to such
funds. 212  Since flood insurance policies are controlled by federal regula-
tion, 213 a conclusion may be drawn that natural catastrophe insurance policies
should be controlled by federal regulation as well. However, similar plans
have been presented to the United States Congress in the past and have failed
simply because there was not a nationwide natural catastrophe insurance
market.214
201. Id. One wonders if the tax benefit of having this trust account would ever amount to
enough to compensate for a significant loss in the event of a natural disaster. Id
202. HM 541 Staff Analysis, supra note 188, at 4.
203. Id. at 4.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. HM 541 Staff Analysis, supra note 188, at 4.
208. NORCROSS, supra note 6, at 239.
209. Id. at 237.
210. See id.
211. Id.
212. See id. at 238.
213. 42 U.S.C. § 4001 (2000).
214. Hollis, supra note 182; see generally SEIFERT & NIEDZIELSKI, supra note 42, at 5-20.
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On November 7, 2006, Florida elected Charlie Crist as its new gover-
nor.215 Throughout the race, all four candidates formulated ideas concerning
hurricane insurance issues, as it was "one of the most talked-about items in
the Florida governor's race. Since then, Florida residents increasingly
"demand" government action. 2 7  Governor Crist also recognizes that "the
need to deliver Floridians relief from high insurance prices" must take prior-
ity.218 In response, the Florida Legislature called a special session specifi-
cally addressing the issue of hurricane insurance.2 9 While all of the propos-
als attempted to lessen the problem, none of them provided an actual solution
to the problem. 220 "In the last three decades, economists and, increasingly,
politicians have argued that the free market advances economic growth and
opportunity more effectively than government policies intended to achieve
such goals.",22' However, the goal of supporting efficiency is based on the
existence of an already competitive marketplace.22 2 Another factor to con-
sider is that the property insurance industry "spends millions of dollars a year
to influence public policy in Florida.2 23  As such, the legislators are not
likely to enforce or create any significant regulations on private insurance
224
companies.
VII. FLORIDA STANDS ALONE
The business of hurricane insurance has a responsibility to provide pro-
tection for their clients, which results in a conflict of interest. The com-
pany's desire to make a profit no longer accommodates the client's desire for
safety resulting in a lose-lose situation. In a high risk industry, such as Flor-
215. Florida Department of State: Division of Elections-Election Results: November 7,
2006 General Election, Official Results, http://election.dos.state.fl.us/elections/resultsarchive/
index.asp?ElectionDate=l 1/7/2006 (select "Governor and Cabinet") (last visited May 27,
2007).
216. Hollis, supra note 182.
217. Off to a Stormy Start, SUN-SENTINEL, Jan. 17, 2007, at IA.
218. Kathy Bushouse, Mark Hollis, & Linda Kleindienst, Insurance Rates May Drop 25%,
SUN-SENTINEL, Jan. 18, 2007, at IA.
219. Kathy Bushouse, What Wrecked Property Insurance?, SUN-SENTINEL, Jan. 13, 2007,
at IA.
220. See id. The proposals included an expansion of the FHCF, freezing Citizens' rates at
the 2006 levels, requiring private insurers who sell homeowners insurance in other states to
also sell homeowners insurance in Florida, and allowing homeowners to buy property insur-
ance without hurricane coverage. Id.
221. Swartz, supra note 1, at 89.
222. Id. at 89-90.
223. Jason Garcia & John Kennedy, Insurance Giants Wield Their Might: Companies
Spend Millions on Campaigns and Lobbying, SN-SENTINEL, Jan. 16, 2007, at IA.
224. See generally id
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ida's hurricane insurance industry, one option is for the insurance companies
to charge higher rates making hurricane insurance unaffordable. 225 Another
option is for the government to require insurance companies to charge lower
rates causing their businesses to suffer.226 A third option is for the federal
government to provide more funds for reinsurance and hope that insurance
companies will lower prices if they can attain lower reinsurance rates. 2 7
The first option has already taken place as premium rates for hurricane
insurance coverage have increased, leaving many Floridians uninsured.228
The second option will help lower hurricane insurance rates, but companies
will attempt to balance their loss by increasing rates in other types of insur-
ance they offer.229 While the third option will help the coastal states and
other states regularly prone to natural disasters, as already discussed, it is not
necessary to every state's needs.23 °
As certainty and stability in the natural catastrophe insurance market is
not enough of an incentive for the federal government to establish a national
solution, the alternative option is for the state government to "provide finan-
cial coverage outright. 231' Florida's unique tropical atmosphere brings se-
vere storms and hurricanes, causing significant damage to residents' homes
every year.232 There is no discrepancy that "insurance companies are not in
the insurance business when it comes to hurricanes., 23 3 "[I]f the government
acts to cover the costs of the worst risks, an inefficient market can become
more efficient, and a non-functioning market can be stimulated to form.
23 4
In furtherance of protecting both the interests of the insurance company
and the interests of the policyholder, the state should provide hurricane in-
surance to its residents. This type of "radical" state action is justified be-
cause hurricane insurance in Florida is now recognized as a necessity, not a
privilege.23 5 Since the government has the ability to tax, the amount of
money previously given to insurance companies to cover hurricane insurance
225. SEIFERT & NIEDZIELSKI, supra note 42, at 1-2.
226. See id. at 21.
227. See Swartz, supra note 1, at 99.
228. See, e.g., Stephanie Horvath, Premium Pressures Force Tough Choices: Homeown-
ers Insurance Rate Hikes, PALM BEACH POST, May 29, 2006, at IF (explaining how one cou-
ple dropped their insurance coverage when the hurricane coverage increased 194%).
229. See SEIFERT & NIEDZIELSKI, supra note 42, at 20.
230. See Swartz, supra note 1, at 99.
231. See id.
232. See NORCROSS, supra note 6, at 195, 236.
233. Id. at 238.
234. Swartz, supra note 1, at 99.
235. See Price, supra note 25 (quoting Bill Newton, the executive director of the Florida
Consumer Action Network).
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should instead be invested and reserved by the state government for catastro-
phic situations. A condition precedent to being entitled to these funds would
be the requirement that each Florida resident assess the value of their home
qualifying them for a certain amount of insurance based on various factors.
By completely removing hurricane insurance from Florida's insurance mar-
ket, insurers no longer have to concern themselves with raising prices or liti-
gation following unpaid claims. The insurance industry will continue to re-
main profitable, as it will offer all other lines of insurance. Further, residents
of Florida will effectively secure hurricane coverage with the guarantee that
there will be enough funds to pay for their claims.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The catastrophic hurricanes which Florida has experienced over the past
few years have caused many people to suffer. As a result, insurance compa-
nies reacted by decreasing their exposure to the market. In effect, most resi-
dents of Florida are left without any hurricane insurance at all. Others are
left spending enormous amounts of money protecting their homes. The de-
cline of the hurricane insurance industry in Florida is part of a chain reaction
causing the state's economy to suffer.236 People from other states are less
likely to move to Florida.237 This prevents Florida residents from having the
opportunity to sell their homes.238 Further, Florida residents who cannot
afford to purchase hurricane insurance come to the realization that they will
need to move to a state with lower risk exposure.2 39
Florida's few remedies offered, including Citizens and the Florida Hur-
ricane Catastrophe Fund, are not adequately functioning to meet the many
needs which they were intended to address.24° Both Citizens and the Florida
Hurricane Catastrophe Fund are still trying to recapitalize after the previous
two hurricane seasons. 241' At the same time, an increasing number of hurri-
cane insurance companies are evacuating the Florida market.242 Therefore,
recapitalization for Citizens will be very difficult as it fulfills its duty as the
insurer of last resort and assumes every policy that is unable to acquire pro-
243tection.
236. See Interview with Walter Campbell, supra note 5.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. See generally TASK FORCE 2006, supra note 8.
241. Id. at 40-42.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 40.
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The need for the government, federal or state, to restore the natural ca-
tastrophe insurance market is ripe for review2 Current proposals for gov-
ernment involvement do not provide an ultimate solution to stabilizing Flor-
ida's insurance market.245 The state urges Congress to aid in Florida's fight
for survival from catastrophic events. 246 At the same time, the federal gov-
ernment restrains from interfering with state policies against natural disas-
ters. This is due to the belief that it would not be of concern to every state.
State government involvement will provide stability in the hurricane insur-
ance market, but will not address every problem hurricane insurance presents
to insurers, policyholders, or the state itself. Therefore, the controversy re-
mains as to how the state or federal government should react as government
involvement with the insurance industry will infringe on traditional concepts
of free trade. 47 Still, recognition of government involvement is evolving
allowing for future changes to be made to adapt to new problems that arise.
244. Id.
245. See Hollis, supra note 182.
246. Id.
247. See id.
23
Graditor: Responsibility for the Restoration of the Hurricane Insurance Ind
Published by NSUWorks, 2007
